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Post 0

Monday, September 22 - 10:43amSanction this postReply
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I wonder if perhaps a better distinction, in terms of cognition, between humans and non-human animals, should we feel compelled to draw such distinction, is not so much a matter of concept-formation -- because I think it's reasonable to conclude from research that many animals can and do form concepts of sorts -- but rather, a matter of mentally manipulating concepts, i.e., having a robust imagination. As Einstein put it: "imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and understand."

Jordan



Post 1

Monday, September 22 - 11:35amSanction this postReply
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The following article says the big difference is mental time travel, imagining the past and future.
http://cogprints.org/729/0/THESIS.txt

I wrote an article Imagination and Cognition, which is here:
http://objectivity-archive.com/volume1_number3.html#57




Post 2

Monday, September 22 - 12:10pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Merlin,

Incidentally, there is a cool article in one of the recent issues of Discover magazine discussing the weird ways our brains record time.

Thanks for the links. I'll check them out in more detail.

Jordan



Post 3

Monday, September 22 - 2:01pmSanction this postReply
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Per animals' ability for mental time travel, there's this recent study indicating that rats and scrub jays (a kind of bird) can't remember *when* they did something but only *whether* they did something and approximately *how long ago* they did it. So they can remember that they experiences something and order their past experiences. But they couldn't tell you what particular moments those experiences occurred. So these animals have some semblance of the past, but it's a weird one.

Jordan



Post 4

Monday, September 22 - 8:37pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

... because I think it's reasonable to conclude from research that many animals can and do form concepts of sorts ...
What's a concept of sorts? What method of concept-formation is used in order to get one?

More to the point, what research shows animals performing in a manner better explained by conceptual awareness than it is by mere memory and crude association?

Ed




Post 5

Tuesday, September 23 - 4:12amSanction this postReply
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What's a concept of sorts? What method of concept-formation is used in order to get one?
Gee, Ed, didn't he tell you?  Weird ones.  :-)





Post 6

Tuesday, September 23 - 1:27pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

Here's a recent abstract of an investigation into the powers of awareness of the most human-like animal on this planet, the bonobo chimpanzee:

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Anim Cogn. 2007 Oct;10(4):461-75.

Mental representation of symbols as revealed by vocabulary errors in two bonobos (Pan paniscus).

Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd, Atlanta, GA 30034, USA. heidilynphd@aol.com

  Error analysis has been used in humans to detect implicit representations and categories in language use. The present study utilizes the same technique to report on mental representations and categories in symbol use from two bonobos (Pan paniscus). These bonobos have been shown in published reports to comprehend English at the level of a two-and-a-half year old child and to use a keyboard with over 200 visuographic symbols (lexigrams).

In this study, vocabulary test errors from over 10 years of data revealed auditory, visual, and spatio-temporal generalizations (errors were more likely items that looked like sounded like, or were frequently associated with the sample item in space or in time), as well as hierarchical and conceptual categorizations.

These error data, like those of humans, are a result of spontaneous responding rather than specific training and do not solely depend upon the sample mode (e.g. auditory similarity errors are not universally more frequent with an English sample, nor were visual similarity errors universally more frequent with a photograph sample).

However, unlike humans, these bonobos do not make errors based on syntactical confusions (e.g. confusing semantically unrelated nouns), suggesting that they may not separate syntactical and semantic information. These data suggest that apes spontaneously create a complex, hierarchical, web of representations when exposed to a symbol system.

================================

The telling phrase above is that "bonobos do not make errors based on syntactical confusions" -- which suggests that they don't integrate at all but, rather, that they memorize exact words and form crude and brute, single-step associations (perceptual ties so tight that they are immune from conceptual confusions). If some kind of an integration is required for the sort of concepts you mentioned above, then I'm at a loss as to where to find the evidence for that in the literature. 

Would you either propose other evidence -- or agree that lack of such justificatory evidence is indeed problematic for the theme of this thread?

 

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/23, 1:30pm)




Post 7

Tuesday, September 23 - 2:08pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Ed,

I tend to agree with Rand about concept formation. It's a matter of mentally lumping some like items together in a set while separating out unlike items. It's a matter of identifying *kinds*, of keeping "mental file folders," as David Kelley likes to say.

I'm not sure why I wrote "concepts of sorts." Not a good word choice. I might've been going for the idea that a reasonable mind could conclude from the evidence that animals can form a limited number of certain kinds of concepts based upon the limitations of their species. The range of concepts that they could possibly form might be severely limited and patchy.

So there are a number of studies I'm thinking about here, all having to do with an animal's ability to classify objects, which is what concept formation is all about, and which I don't think can be attributed to mere association.

To name a few, field studies indicate that chickadees and crows respond to danger calls from other birds. They discern a particular *kind* of call, separate that call from other calls, and respond the same way to that kind of call regardless of what beak it's coming from.

Chimps can identify a *kind* of twig that's good for ant fishing, distinguishing them from lousy twigs.

Countless animals can identify *kinds* of other species, which are their kin, which are friendly, which are dangerous, which are prey.

In the lab, lots of animals (dogs, cats, horses, mice, crows, parrots, gorrillas, chimps, elephants, seals, and more) have been tested in the games of "which of these is not like the other?" and "what item in this pile belongs in the group over here?" -- the basic tests to indicate whether a subject "gets" concepts.

I think it's reasonable to conclude from these studies that animals understand certain "kinds."

"Kinds" cannot be grasped through mere association. Mere association is a matter of mentally connecting events, not of classifying them. Besides, consider the test involving introduction of a novel item. A researcher can introduce a novel item -- a particular item of which a subject has no previous association -- and the subject will respond to it the same way as it did to others of its kind. If the subject were limited to mere associations, the subject would treat novel items rather randomly and with a response bearing little resemblance to the subject's response to items of the same kind.

But, I'd much rather talk about imagination! I can think only of a handful of tests that get at subject's imaginative capabilities, most of which having to do with an appeal to mental imagery, as opposed to trial and error, when solving problems.

Merlin,

My use of the term "weird" referred to how the brain keeps time; you incorrectly indicated that I used to the term to describe the studies over animal concepts.

Jordan



Post 8

Tuesday, September 23 - 2:25pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Ed,

Our posts crossed. I don't know this study, but from the looks of it, It appears actually to accept that Bonobos make classifications -- which I take as an ability to form concepts; the study just denies that bonobos' ability to use symbols is much more than a matter of associations.

Jordan



Post 9

Tuesday, September 23 - 4:11pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Jordan,

I realize that you'd rather talk about imagination. Perhaps that turns this into a thread hijack. If you'd rather that I start a new thread on this debate -- then let me know.

To give you an idea of where I'm about to go in response to your post 7, my point of contention would be whether animals indentify and classify (natural) kinds either out in the world -- or even in labs.

Ed




Post 10

Wednesday, September 24 - 10:27amSanction this postReply
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Hi Ed,

Yes, please start a new thread. I suspect you'll claim that animals do not identify and classify kinds, but rather just associations. Ought to be intriguing.

FYI, I might not be able to get back here till Sunday.

Cheers,
Jordan



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