Peikoff and Agnosticism

Nick,

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There is an agnostic position which rejects a "belief" in God, yet rejecting a "belief" in God is not making a knowledge claim. You aren't distinguishing between "belief" and "knowledge" and dealing wth the burden of proof issue.
===============

I understand the difference between belief and knowledge, Nick. I even wrote a damn essay on that difference ...

http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Thompson/The_Veridicality_of_Conceptual_Discernment.shtml

... And Peikoff sufficiently dealt with the "burden of proof issue" ...

=================
Objectivism's refutation of theism, to take another example, is not a case of "proving a negative" in the sense vetoed by the onus-of-proof principle. Ayn Rand does not start with a zero and seek to discover evidence of God's nonexistence. She starts with reality, i.e., with (philosophically) known fact, then denies a claim that clashes with it.
=================

So, that leaves you making a storm in a teacup, and me wondering why the hell you are doing that.

Ed

Post 41

Sunday, July 30, 2006 - 1:36am

Joseph S. addressed the problem of evil as follows:

Part of it goes: �If God can prevent the suffering of the innocent, yet chooses not to, He is not good.� And why not?

Let us consider why God does allow such suffering, problem by problem. A) Death: Why does God allow an earth he created to kill thousands in natural disasters? Why does he allow thousands to die of disease? When one has a correct view of the life, and life after death, this is hardly a problem. It is equivalent to picking a child up from school, where he learns what he needs to, though it is not always enjoyable.

I don't understand this analogy. Life after death notwithstanding, allowing natural disasters to kill thousands when God could easily prevent it is evil. It is tantamount to murder.

B) Suffering caused by others: Free will is necessary, both from a religious and a philosophical standpoint. Where there is no choice, there is no good, and there is no evil. There would be no point to teaching, or to learning, or even to life, there would be no right or wrong choices.

Joseph, suppose that someone discovered a drug that would take away the desire to harm others and imbue everyone with the desire to respect people's rights. Would you say that we should refrain from taking the drug, because it would eliminate evil and therefore right and wrong choices -- that with such a drug, there would be no point to life? No, of course, you wouldn't. Then why do you say that if God could imbue people with the desire to respect everyone's rights, he shouldn't do it? In fact, what Objectivism seeks is a world in which people are so firmly convinced of the importance of individual rights, they have no desire to violate them, no desire to harm others.

God, realizing the need to allow everyone to choose, allows people to make choices that would harm others. If he were to impose immediate justice everyone time we were about to harm someone �unfairly,� no one would be able to do any evil.

Yes, but only in the sense that no would be motivated to do evil, because they wouldn't see it as in their self-interest. Why is that bad? Isn't that what we want?

There would be no good, because everyone would be compelled to act rightly.

There is a sense in which everyone would be compelled to abstain from evil -- to abstain from harming others -- but they would still have an alternative; they could still choose evil, if they wanted to; it's just that they wouldn't want to, because if they did choose it, they'd suffer the consequences. Again, why is that bad? Isn't that what we want? -- a world in which people have no desire to choose evil -- no desire to violate rights -- because it's against their self-interest?

Can we say a man is good if he were chained to the wall his entire life, because he did no evil?

No, of course not, but that's not exactly the situation here, is it? People are not literally chained to the wall; they still have an alternative; it's just that they have no reason to choose it. So, in one sense, it's a choice; in another sense, it isn't: It's a choice insofar as they could choose it if they wanted to. It's not a choice insofar as they cannot choose it because they don't want to.

God is not evil by allowing such, because it must be so, by all laws of God, reason, and the universe. Otherwise there would be no point to this life.

Yes, there would. The "point" would be the achievement of one's values in a world in which everyone's rights are respected.

Justice is real.

Yes, but what is justice? It is giving every person his due by respecting his freedom and redressing its violation.

Those who are harmed will be healed, and those who harm receive judgment.

Why wait until people are harmed? Why allow harm to take place in the first place? A God who could prevent it but doesn't is malevolent and perhaps even sadistic.

C) Suffering caused by circumstance: This is the most � in my opinion the only � difficult question facing us today. I am still considering the issue. The vast majority of suffering is caused by others (B) and is useful to us in building character. We learn more, as most philosophers and psychologists have recognized, when we have struggles and obstacles.

The only reason we need to learn to handle suffering is because it exists, but that doesn't mean that we shouldn't endeavor to eliminate it, if we can. And certainly, if God could eliminate it, which he can, then he is evil for not doing it.

If a crippled child cannot immediately build character, he and those around him must, as he grows.

If the purpose for building character is to handle suffering, then there's no need to build character, if one can eliminate suffering. Alternatively, if there is another purpose for building character, then suffering needn't be a part of it. In either case, suffering is not required, and should not be considered a value.

There are more difficult questions, such as the senile man, struggling and frustrated by his failing mind. Would God allow us to suffer, even when we have nothing to gain, in order to teach a lesson to those around us?

What kind of lesson could that be? To teach us how to handle suffering ourselves? But if he can eliminate suffering entirely, which he can, then there is no need for such a lesson in the first place.

Were such sufferings the will of God? Someone will ask. This is a shortsighted question. Does God want us to be in pain? Certainly not.

Then why does he allow it?

But it was his will to allow them, rather than to stop them, so he allows such suffering, which He realizes is better than any alternative.

How could it be better than any alternative, if a life free of pain is better, which it is. Pain and suffering are not values; they are disvalues and should be eliminated wherever possible. A supreme being who could eliminate them easily and effortlessly but chooses not to is evil.

Do you feel like you deserve an easy life of pain-free suffering?

"Pain-free suffering" is an oxymoron. I assume you mean an easy life free of pain and free of suffering. In that case, my answer is: yes, if the reason I don't have it is because someone else (e.g., an omnipotent being who created the world and everything in it) is the direct cause of that suffering.

- Bill

Post 42

Sunday, July 30, 2006 - 9:46am

So, that leaves you making a storm in a teacup, and me wondering why the hell you are doing that.

Because you are simply not dealing with my post. Peikoff says all agnostics are cowards, benchsitters who allow that God may exist. I described the postion of the weak atheist, which is an agnostic position and is not the postion Peikoff calls cowardly. Therefore, Peikoff is wrong.

Also, just because someone mentions onus of proof in a different context doesn't mean he dealt with the issue as I presented it. I said that the person who makes the knowledge claim has the burden, and I rejected the "cannot prove a negative" excuse by excepting that proving something to be contradctory or in conflict with reality is good enough to prove it doesn't exist.

I don't think you are readng my posts carefully.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 43

Sunday, July 30, 2006 - 9:49am

I am a believer in Russell's Teapot in space!!! LOL!

-- Bridget

Post 44

Sunday, July 30, 2006 - 2:29pm

There is actually an old saying about making a tempest in a teapot. I think that's where Ed got his storm in a teacup.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 45

Sunday, July 30, 2006 - 5:50pm

Nick,

=================
I don't think you are readng my posts carefully.
=================

Be sure, I'm reading your posts carefully (now). The reason that you still think that all agnostics are cowards -- according to Peikoff -- is the you fail to understand when it's proper to be agnostic on something.

Agnosticism is only proper when there is some (albeit insufficient) amount of evidence supporting a proposition. When there is NO evidence supporting a proposition -- then agnosticism (rather than blithe dismissal) becomes an immoral position (granting the arbitrary the very same weight as the directly known).

Get it, now?

Ed

Post 46

Sunday, July 30, 2006 - 6:34pm

No, I don't get it. I think you and Peikoff are redefining the term "agnostic." And, I don't even think the two of you agree. Peikoff simply says agnostcism is cowardly. He doesn't say it is sometimes appropriate, as you do.

If there is NO evidence for a proposition, it doesn't mean it is untrue. An agnostic can reject a belief in the truth of the proposition but refrain from saying it is untrue. This places the burden on the one who claims, as knowledge, not just belief, that it is true. There is nothing immoral or cowardly about doing this.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 47

Monday, July 31, 2006 - 5:29am

Nick,

The time and energy that it takes for you to say that you "reject a belief in the truth of a[n arbitrary] proposition" -- is wasted time that could have been spent on living well. When folks mention the arbitrary -- it's as if they've said nothing at all.

Now, sure, if you have a personal investment in the person, the person challenging you with the arbitrary -- or, if you get a personal benefit from defending against the arbitrary (refining your debating skills, confirming your competence, etc) -- then, okay, defend away. But when Peikoff was talking about the arbitrary, he meant it in a universalized way.

Picture 10,000 people who wanted to talk to you about the arbitrary, Nick -- persistent people who demanded that you take the requisite time to answer their concerns. That's what Peikoff meant.

Get it?

Ed

Post 48

Monday, July 31, 2006 - 8:16am

I'd say the real mysticism is in making a decision about what happens after death. Agnosticism is a policy that leaves speculating post-life to the birds.

Post 49

Monday, July 31, 2006 - 9:31am

Peikoff said the agnostic postion is cowardly. I said he is wrong. There is the position of the weak atheist, which is agnostic, which is not cowardly. And, there is no wasting time by putting the burden of proof on those making knowledge claims. When someone makes no knowledge claim, as the weak athest makes no knowledge claim, there is no burden and, thus, no need to waste time defending anything.

I still don't think you follow me.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 50

Monday, July 31, 2006 - 1:17pm

Nick, it's in the definitions.

One of the essential characteristics of theistic agnosticism (according to Peikoff), is taking the time and energy to evaluate this arbitrary proposition -- in order to get to the conclusion that you don't know the truth-value of it.

You have been "calling" weak-atheism "agnostic" (because, like agnosticism, it doesn't make truth claims, but merely refrains from condoning positive belief), but the purpose of concepts is the effective distinction they afford between the different things in the world. To collapse weak-atheism into agnosticism (as you've done) is epistemologically incorrect.

By viewing weak-atheism as "agnostic" you blur the conceptual categories, and your argument contra Peikoff becomes a Straw Man fallacy. Peikoff, himself, would most likely take issue with you viewing weak-atheism from the agnostic perspective. Agnosticism is not what it is that is essential to weak-atheism (that's why they're 2 different categories in the first place).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/31, 1:19pm)

Post 51

Monday, July 31, 2006 - 4:20pm

Ed,

How is not making truth claims being exempt from positive belief? Post-life speculation is just about as explainable as magic!

Post 52

Monday, July 31, 2006 - 5:31pm

You have been "calling" weak-atheism "agnostic" (because, like agnosticism, it doesn't make truth claims, but merely refrains from condoning positive belief), but the purpose of concepts is the effective distinction they afford between the different things in the world. To collapse weak-atheism into agnosticism (as you've done) is epistemologically incorrect.

No, you are not reading me correctly. The weak atheist definitely rejects belief in God, not merely refraining from believing. He does refrain from making a knowledge claim. He puts the burden of proof on those who do. You don't seem to be distinguishing between belief and knowledge. Huxley, who coined the term "agnostic" meant simply this, that one cannot make a knowledge claim.

By viewing weak-atheism as "agnostic" you blur the conceptual categories, and your argument contra Peikoff becomes a Straw Man fallacy. Peikoff, himself, would most likely take issue with you viewing weak-atheism from the agnostic perspective. Agnosticism is not what it is that is essential to weak-atheism (that's why they're 2 different categories in the first place).

Peikoff is the one who blurs categories by classifying all agnostics as bench sitters who are afraid to commit to belief or knowledge. There are some agnostcs like that, but that does not include all agnostics. Both weak atheists and weak theists are agnostic because their views are based on belief, not knowledge. Peikoff doesn't recognize this.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 53

Tuesday, August 1, 2006 - 12:07am

Nick,

We're officially talking past each other. I don't normally say this in debate -- hell, I can't even REMEMBER saying it before -- but "I give up" (knock yourself out with the other posters, though).

Ed
[first time for everything, I guess]

Post 54

Tuesday, August 1, 2006 - 11:35am

I agree that we are talking past each other. I started the thread and tried to get you on topic. I failed.

If anyone else wants to read my initial post and take issue with what I say about Peikoff and his misrepresentation and condemnation of all agnosticism, I'm willing to debate. Just make sure you understand what I'm sayng before you go off on a tangent.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 55

Thursday, August 3, 2006 - 11:22pm

Nicholas:

     Correct me if I'm wrong, but...

     An agnostic (re any theism) makes/implies 2 claims:
        1) The claim that "'X'-does-not-exist", just as the claim that "'X'-does-exist", requires enough evidence to constitute logical, rational proof of its truth/validation.
         2) The claim that "'God'-does-not-exist" does not meet this requirement any more than "'God'-does-exist", regardless how one defines/characterizes 'God.' (Ergo, agnosticism)

      Peikoff has made extremely clear that he takes issue, in a logical-analysis sense, with the 1st claim. In terms of a 'logical-evaluation' of that, it would automatically follow, logically, that such is to be 'condemned'...as a false belief. --- Like, you know, what false belief should not be so 'condemned', but instead, 'tolerated'? None that I know of.

     You refer to 'all agnostics' and 'all agnosticism' as if there were, like religions and philosophies, many differing ones which and whom Peikoff 'blurs categories' regarding. Here, you've perplexed me.

     Given that we're talking agnosticism re ANY theistic beliefs, we're really only talking about *1* subject/category, no? If not, then how many sub-categories/versions of agnosticism are there...which substantially, fundamentally, 'in essence'... differentiate each from the other in any relevent-to-this-discussion way? I mean, your complaint sounds like Peikoff talked about the nature of gender-differences but didn't take into consideration transexuals or platinum-dyed-blondes. I'm lost as to your actual problem with any part of his actual specified a-r-g-u-m-e-n-t re agnosticism/agnostic-belief/'agnostics'.

     Granted, Peikoff is not making much of any distinction between belief and knowledge. I'm not clear why he should. He's a philosopher, not a psychologist, and therefore little concerned with all the various (myriad?) motivations involved in psychology of beliefs, as well he should be. He's only concerned with those who have a rational psychology for believing anything, hence only those who are concerned with 'knowledge', and not mere 'belief.' You may dislike that he lumps all these 'types' and evaluates all identically ('bench-sitters', etc), but, a belief without knowledge is really little more than satisfaction-in-ignorance, no?

     Hmmm...the 'evaluation'. Methinks this is what bugs you.

     If I may analogize...

     'Santa' is a belief many children are brought up with. At some point or other, age-wise, all (but for the very, literally, retarded) come to the 'conclusion' that there just ain't one. Most do not usually advertise this to their believing friends...immediately, anyways. Guess why? Fear. Fear of hurting their feelings; fear of being seen as different, hence an outsider; fear of knowing they may get in trouble with 'authorities' (their own, or their friends' PARENTS!). To be sure, in their new-found belief, they have no direct fear for themselves...while they keep their trap shut. But, as soon as they say "There isn't any 'Santa'", they know they will have some problem. So...the safe thing to say is "Well, I never seen him, but, hey, who knows?" --- But, this is an interim stage of course, until they realize when they're old enough (and crossed a social-threshold) that they are allowed to acknowledge their disbelief amongst all the others 'in the know', as long as they don't hurt the feelings of the younger kept-ignorant ones.

      Peikoff's evaluative view of agnostics I must admit I'm not that clear on, other than they're 'evading' dealing with the subject of theism in a totally rational manner. From what I've read of his arguments, he really should have made more clear (as N. Branden also should have) that there is no acceptable 'rational' reason for accepting claim #1) (above), ergo, the acceptance of it is not only irrational, but, purposefully so. Here, however, we're getting out of philosophy proper and delving into psychology: motivations for belief-acceptance. This is a sticky wicket to discuss, so I'll not do so at this point herein.

     Anyhoo, Nick (St. Nick? Sorry; couldn't help it. HAD to type that), your problem with Peikoff isn't really his argument against agnosticism so much as his evaluation of those who accept it, is what I see here. It's not the subject's argument, it's the persons' evaluations, no?

     Regardless, re the subject itself (agnosticism, not agnostics; the Song, not the Singers), taking a tip from Bertrand Russell and using 'the-author-of-Waverly' gambit, substituting 'the-creator-of-the-Universe' for 'God', and 'the-Xmas-presents-bringer' for 'Santa', if one accepts the above claim #1) and applies it to 'the-creator-of-the-Universe', and, ergo, should be an agnostic re...HER...then one should also be an agnostic re 'the-Xmas-presents-bringer' as well. --- We know that no one is the latter. What 'reason' applies there that is not applicable to the former?

LLAP
J:D

(Edited by John Dailey on 8/03, 11:51pm)

Post 56

Friday, August 4, 2006 - 11:26am

Quote:
(JD)Correct me if I'm wrong, but...

An agnostic (re any theism) makes/implies 2 claims:
1) The claim that "'X'-does-not-exist", just as the claim that "'X'-does-exist", requires enough evidence to constitute logical, rational proof of its truth/validation.
2) The claim that "'God'-does-not-exist" does not meet this requirement any more than "'God'-does-exist", regardless how one defines/characterizes 'God.' (Ergo, agnosticism)

(Nick)You have to be a little more complete. You have to make clear in the first claim you mentioned if it is a knowledge claim or a belief claim. Someone may believe that X does or does not exist but not know. Belief is different from knowledge in that one may believe what isn�t true and has no burden to proof to be true what he or she acknowledges may be untrue. People can �believe� whatever they want, but if they make a knowledge claim, they have a burden of proof. With regard to your second claim, yes, if they are knowledge claims, not a belief claims only, both existence and non-existence have to be proven.

Quote:
(JD)Peikoff has made extremely clear that he takes issue, in a logical-analysis sense, with the 1st claim. In terms of a 'logical-evaluation' of that, it would automatically follow, logically, that such is to be 'condemned'...as a false belief. --- Like, you know, what false belief should not be so 'condemned', but instead, 'tolerated'? None that I know of.

(Nick)Things such as faith and belief are not subject to the same standards as knowledge. Knowledge can be proven to be untrue, in which case it is no longer knowledge. However, if it is proven not to be knowledge, it can still be belief. According to Plato, one can believe what isn�t true. �False belief� is no more a concept than is �false opinion.� If I say, �I like chocolate ice cream,� it is incorrect to say I am wrong or making a false claim. Beliefs are relative, but knowledge is universal, as true or false for one person as it is for another.

Quote:
(JD)You refer to 'all agnostics' and 'all agnosticism' as if there were, like religions and philosophies, many differing ones which and whom Peikoff 'blurs categories' regarding. Here, you've perplexed me.

(Nick)I don�t know why so many people are perplexed. There are many kinds of agnostics. There are those who sit on the fence and refuse to commit to knowledge or belief, and there are the weak atheists, who reject belief but make no knowledge claim. The weak atheists, according to Huxley, who coined the term �agnostic,� are agnostic because their views are based on belief, not knowledge. When Peikoff includes them in with those who sit on the fence, he is blurring categories, like saying all Jews are guilty of usury or starting all wars. I think I made this clear in my initial post in this thread and don�t understand why people don�t read it carefully, unless they are seeing only what they want to see and blocking out, for some psychological reason, some of what I actually said.

Quote:
(JD) Given that we're talking agnosticism re ANY theistic beliefs, we're really only talking about *1* subject/category, no? If not, then how many sub-categories/versions of agnosticism are there...which substantially, fundamentally, 'in essence'... differentiate each from the other in any relevent-to-this-discussion way? I mean, your complaint sounds like Peikoff talked about the nature of gender-differences but didn't take into consideration transexuals or platinum-dyed-blondes. I'm lost as to your actual problem with any part of his actual specified a-r-g-u-m-e-n-t re agnosticism/agnostic-belief/'agnostics'.

(Nick)Philosophers should be a little more careful and not always lump everything into one category. An auto mechanic differentiates between a spark plug and a carburetor. He doesn�t just call them all doohickeys or thingamajigs.

Quote:
Granted, Peikoff is not making much of any distinction between belief and knowledge. I'm not clear why he should. He's a philosopher, not a psychologist, and therefore little concerned with all the various (myriad?) motivations involved in psychology of beliefs, as well he should be. He's only concerned with those who have a rational psychology for believing anything, hence only those who are concerned with 'knowledge', and not mere 'belief.' You may dislike that he lumps all these 'types' and evaluates all identically ('bench-sitters', etc), but, a belief without knowledge is really little more than satisfaction-in-ignorance, no?

(Nick)If a distinction between belief and knowledge exists, then not recognizing it is not very philosophical or scholarly. And, people do believe things all the time which are not sufficiently justified to be considered knowledge. If we waited before taking a step to verify with 100% certainty that the ground would not fall from under us with our next step, we would probably stand still a lot.

Quote:
(JD)Hmmm...the 'evaluation'. Methinks this is what bugs you.

If I may analogize...

'Santa' is a belief many children are brought up with. At some point or other, age-wise, all (but for the very, literally, retarded) come to the 'conclusion' that there just ain't one. Most do not usually advertise this to their believing friends...immediately, anyways. Guess why? Fear. Fear of hurting their feelings; fear of being seen as different, hence an outsider; fear of knowing they may get in trouble with 'authorities' (their own, or their friends' PARENTS!). To be sure, in their new-found belief, they have no direct fear for themselves...while they keep their trap shut. But, as soon as they say "There isn't any 'Santa'", they know they will have some problem. So...the safe thing to say is "Well, I never seen him, but, hey, who knows?" --- But, this is an interim stage of course, until they realize when they're old enough (and crossed a social-threshold) that they are allowed to acknowledge their disbelief amongst all the others 'in the know', as long as they don't hurt the feelings of the younger kept-ignorant ones.

(Nick)But this isn�t the weak atheist position I was talking about, the position which rejects belief but refrains from making knowledge claims.

Quote:
(JD)Peikoff's evaluative view of agnostics I must admit I'm not that clear on, other than they're 'evading' dealing with the subject of theism in a totally rational manner. From what I've read of his arguments, he really should have made more clear (as N. Branden also should have) that there is no acceptable 'rational' reason for accepting claim #1) (above), ergo, the acceptance of it is not only irrational, but, purposefully so. Here, however, we're getting out of philosophy proper and delving into psychology: motivations for belief-acceptance. This is a sticky wicket to discuss, so I'll not do so at this point herein.

(Nick)You are slowly touching on something else. Just because there is no rational reason for accepting a claim, it doesn�t mean the claim is false. Lack of evidence is not evidence of lack. There may be reason in the future. The only reasonable position, then, in such a situation, is to refrain from making a knowledge claim and pout the burden on those who do, one way or the other.

Quote:
(JD)Anyhoo, Nick (St. Nick? Sorry; couldn't help it. HAD to type that), your problem with Peikoff isn't really his argument against agnosticism so much as his evaluation of those who accept it, is what I see here. It's not the subject's argument, it's the persons' evaluations, no?

(Nick)Suppose someone told you your problem with Mel Gibson is not so much with what he said but with his evaluation of Jews? There�s no difference, John. Peikoff�s argument and his evaluations are the same thing.

Quote:
(JD)Regardless, re the subject itself (agnosticism, not agnostics; the Song, not the Singers), taking a tip from Bertrand Russell and using 'the-author-of-Waverly' gambit, substituting 'the-creator-of-the-Universe' for 'God', and 'the-Xmas-presents-bringer' for 'Santa', if one accepts the above claim #1) and applies it to 'the-creator-of-the-Universe', and, ergo, should be an agnostic re...HER...then one should also be an agnostic re 'the-Xmas-presents-bringer' as well. --- We know that no one is the latter. What 'reason' applies there that is not applicable to the former?

(Nick)No, I object to calling all agnostics cowards as I would object to calling all agnosticism cowardly. Agnostics are agnostic just as cowards are cowardly, but some agnostics can be uncowardly just as some Jews can be not responsible for wars.

Bis bald,

Nick

Post 57

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 1:35am

Nicholas:

     You've made clear that you see the abstract distinction between 'belief' and 'knowledge' as relevent to the subject of agnosticism. You've not made clear why a philosopher (Peikoff) should see this psychologically-oriented distinction as philosophically relevent or ethically (philosophically speaking) non-evaluative.

     You've made clear that your real prob with Peikoff is his evaluation of ('all') agnostics as being epistemologically-speaking, cowards.

     I've made clear as to why I disagree with you re the worth of the distinction and his (as N. Branden's original argument about 'evasion') evaluation.

     We'll have to agree to disagree about the saliency of the debated factors here. Let's let it go.

You bring up another point however, which I must comment on.

Just because there is no rational reason for accepting a claim, it doesn't mean the claim is false. Lack of evidence is not lack. There may be a reason in the future. The only reasonable position, then in such a situation, is to refrain from making a knowledge claim and put the burden on those who do, one way or the other.

     "Just because there is no rational reason [is there any other kind?] for accepting a claim, it doesn't mean the claim is false" --- True. No argument. H-o-w-e-v-e-r, it DOES mean that the 'claim' IS rationally ignorable as-if-it-was-false, especially when the 'claim' appears self-contradictory (as in the common-idea of God's undisputed [except maybe by agnostics?!] 'powers' of Infallibility, Omniscience, Omnipotence, etc). --- Example: "I just drew a square circle yesterday after I created a perpetual-motion machine; oh, and I can prove that leprechauns might exist...somewhere we haven't been to yet" --- Yeah, right, sure; lemme pay more attention to these 'claims'. Agnostics...for whatever 'reasons'...might find these (can we say 'arbitrary'?) claims worth NOT ignoring; atheists wouldn't. Guess why?

     "Lack of evidence is not lack." --- Uh-h, say again? Maybe you meant "Lack of evidence for 'X' is not evidence that 'X' is non-existent/not-true/etc." Technically, academically, again (if that's your intended meaning), true. No argument. Um-m-m, ntl...please re-read my arguments about the epistemological/'knowledge'-worth of this perspective...above. Or, if you can accept it: "Lack of evidence of 'X'...is to make any 'claim' about 'X' totally ignorable, ergo, not worthwhile in considering. How can one make this point any plainer to one who is 'reasonable'? To a 'rational' person, it's as if no utterance was uttered.____ Re-phrase: Technically, such statement/proposition types CAN be argued (in the myopically-'mathematical' meaning of 'logical')as not-being-'logically-proved'-as-false. So? Ergo, they're 'logically possible' as being 'true'? If you buy that criterion, then it's 'logically possible' that you may (ahem!) not really know (ahem) the, er, rational meaning of 'logically possible', correct? (Nm that it's therefore 'logically possible' that Donald Duck is always behind you avoiding your attempts to see him). However, I don't buy the worth of this view of 'logically possible'; and, I don't think that any 'reasonable' person could...nm would.

     "There may be a reason in the future" --- That little word 'may' methinks raises all of the problems, with all the epistemological pressure resting on it. How does one 'know' (or have 'belief'?) that there really 'may' be such? Maybe there won't! Shades of the can-of-worms-of-'possible-possibilities' (no, that's not redundant)! Can one be agnostic about 'maybes'? Or are 'definites' all one can be agnostic about? Anyhoo, to consider hypothetical future...conceivabilities...as relevent to present beliefs, well, then I must ask: "Why is 'God' the apparently ONLY subject to be 'agnostic' about? What about Hera or Krishna (or Lilith)?

     "The only reasonable position, then in such a situation...[etc]" --- Uh, no; NOT true; especially in light of my above concerns. Strictly speaking, the only 'reasonable' position, then, in such a situation...is to ignore, not just psychologically, but epistemologically [!] such (so-called) 'claims' about Bigfoot, Venusians bottling Coke, Cleo-the-Astrological-Counselor-of-relationships, Altairians counterfeiting money on Jupiter to economically destablise the whole earth, Ishtar's succubi running the Illuminati from the 8th supernatural dimension, Jessica Rabbit directing the Feminazis, 'God', and dare I add: SANTA!

     You noteworthily never answered my last question about how we should properly regard Santa; should we, 'reasonably', rationally, consider Santa as a possible existent, or not? If not, WHY not? If so, then we should all be 'agnostic' regarding him, no? --- You avoided (evaded) my last post's ending question on this in your last response. If you wish a continued response from me to your next response to this, please delineate your view of the 'reasonable' agnostic view regarding Santa (and now add Cleo, etc-from-above)...and how you see it differing from 'God.' Else...I'll not be responding back...though I may respond, to others, about.

LLAP
J:D

(Edited by John Dailey on 8/06, 2:08am)

(Edited by John Dailey on 8/06, 3:03am)

Post 58

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 9:19am

You are getting a bit hysterical, JD. You misquoted me and twisted some of my words to fit your straw men. I said, "Lack of evidence is not evidence of lack." This means that just because there is no reason to accept that somethng exists, it doesn't mean it doesn't. It also doesn't mean it does. It means one does not have reason or evidence to make a knowledge claim about its existence or non-existence. It doesn't mean I am holding out for the possibility that it might exist or giving it more consideration than it deserves.

I think we can say that square circles do not exist in objectve reality. We can argue for this rationally. We can also argue against the existence of concepts of God that fall into this same category. There is also the category of mythological characters such as Santa. If we can prove rationally that God is in this or the other category, then I have no problem making a knowledge claim saying He doesn't exist in objective reality. (I said this in my initial essay at the beginning of this thread.)

If something is not logically proved as true, it doesn't mean it is false. It is simply not proven as true. And, if somethng is not proven as false, it doesn't mean it is true. O.J. Simpson was not proven to be guilty, according to his jury in his criminal trial. That didn't mean he was innocent, except by assumption. The burden of proving his guilt was not met, according to the jury.

Burden of proof is an important issue. If it is abused, someone could claim as knowledge that God exists on the basis that He can't be proven not to exist. We don't want that, do we?

You are accusing me of evading you, JD, but I think you ignored and evaded my points for the propostion that Peikof's "evaluation" of all agnostics is every bit as immoral as Mel Gbson's evaluation of all Jews. Your contention that he is seperating philosophy from psychology just doesn't fly.

bis bald,

Nick

(Edited by Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani on 8/06, 9:24am)

Post 59

Wednesday, August 9, 2006 - 6:25pm