Thanks, Merlin. As always you offer interesting insights and perspectives.  I will keep to Rand's essential distinguishing characteristic that egoism is the primary benefit of self, whereas altruism is the primary benefit of other people.  We of the "me generation" influenced as we are by Rand find it hard to understand her argument because so few consistent altruists exist nowadays.  Even Sen. Elizabeth Warren says that entrepreneurs who start businesses should make mountains of money -- just that they also need to pay mountains of taxes, of course.  Over on the "Galt's Gulch Online" board we have "Chrisitan egoists" who cite the mandate to "love your neighbor as you love yourself."

Perhaps we can grant that "altruism" has changed (softened) in meaning since Comte invented the word.  Apparently, "egoism" has changed, also, perhaps because of Ayn Rand.  She said that when she wrote The Fountainhead, she did not distinguish egoism from egotism, in part because her grasp of English was imperfect, but also because the words were not clearly delineated in the dictionary on her desk.

I am not sure how to validte your claim, "Most modern philosophers treat egoism and altruism as mutually exclusive, as do many other people and religions."  By "philosophers" do you mean "college instructors and university professors teaching philosophy classes"?  Would you include all of us here in the blogosphere who philosophize? My own experience is that college and university folk accept altruism as the moral standard and at best seek to find out if egoism can meet that standard.

Morality and rational self-interest. Edited by David P. Gauthier. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

• Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.
• Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.
• Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.
• In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.
• Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.
• Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.
• Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.
• The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.
• Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.
• Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.

Morality and self-interest , edited by Paul Bloomfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

• The trouble with justice / Christopher W. Morris 
• Nietzsche on selfishness, justice, and the duties of the higher men / Mathias Risse 
• Morality, schmorality / Richard Joyce 
• Because it's right / David Schmidtz 
• The value of inviolability / Thomas Nagel 
• Potential congruence / Samuel Scheffler 
• Too much morality / Stephen Finlay 
• Scotus and the possibility of moral motivation / T. H. Irwin 
• Butler on virtue, self-interest, and human nature / Ralph Wedgwood 
• Virtue ethics and the charge of egoism / Julia Annas 
• Morality, self, and others / W. D. Falk 
• Why it's bad to be bad / Paul Bloomfield 
• Classical and sour forms of virtue / Joel J. Kupperman 
• Shame and guilt / Michael Stocker.

The essay titles themselves may not be fully revealing.  I assure you that "in Defense of Egoism" by J. Kalin really is that kind of exploration which attempts to show that egoism can be altruistic, that being self-centered can lead you to being nice to other people.  Selfishness needs a justification.  

However, I point also to the 38 years - an entire generation - between the two anthologies.  The debate has become more subtle, with more latitude granted to what we understand: primary self-interest as the only necessary justification.

Excellent article, Merlin!

Most of the confusion arises from the definition of altruism, but also about the difference between actions and moral principles.  

Does a moral philosophy require sacrifice under some circumstances for us to call it altruism?  There could be very moderate forms of altruism proposed where the individual is "permitted" to pursue their own happiness, but will at some point treat a conflict between the individual's well-being and and that of others with a call to sacrifice.  Or it could be a harsh form altruism that treats any form of happiness or personal gain as a terrible sin that calls for more sacrifice.  But they are only differences in degree and both agree that, at some point, others are to be valued over self.

Your venn diagram about interactions between people doesn't show some pertinent complications - motivation/psychology. We derive some set of values and ethics (whether it was absorbed unthinkingly from the surroundings or thought out and chosen).  And, to a degree, aspects of our psychology follow. A dedicated and observant Christian will make sacrifices and would feel guilt if he didn't. But he may also have formed powerful defenses against low self-esteem that lead him to 'sin' with 'selfish' actions.  People can, and do, have mixed premises, and mixed motivations, and differing levels of awareness.

Philosophy, psychology, and the resultant set of actions are like three different horizontal layers of venn diagrams that relate to interactions with others that attempt to deliniate the understanding of altruism/egoism in action.

I completely agree with having non-overlapping circles when talking about the philosophy of egoism and the philosophy of altruism. Those who try to find a middle ground are simply muddled, and probably altruists who want to find a way to make it seem less harsh, or egoist who are trying to appease altruists with a hope for middle ground.  But the concept is clear.  In a conflict there must be a choice, and if the choice is that others must be treated as the primary beneficiary - for moral reasons - then it is altruism and can never intersect with egoism.

I think that part of Rand's genius was to see that one has to choose a principle of who should be the primary beneficiary - even in the most benevolent of cultures where no one is calling for extreme, or even mild sacrifices. Otherwise, this choice - which is an abstraction - this definition of what is the primary value, when it isn't clear means that the mechanism for logically parsing all subsequent value priorities is left muddled.

The structure of knowledge is such that we must goes from a base of what should the primary value be,  to the issue of moral sovereignty and the issue of the rightness in acting towards one's own happiness under all circumstances.  Without a clear choice in who should be the primary value, there is no individual sovereignty, and there can be no clear cut political principles to define the boundaries for actions. We often jump right to individual rights (their having arisen from our metaphysical nature) but when we look through any lense where we are viewing the primary difference between altruism and egoism we see - from that differing perspective - the logical necessity of egoism for being able to defend having free association, legal protections for individual rights, free trade, etc.

Said another way it is, "You can do anything you want.  But to do so with moral certainty, you must recognize that this is not for you alone, but for all who are human." And, to make that work, you have to find a universal set of boundaries of actions - individual rights. What you can do by right, versus what you have to have permission to do.
--------------------

“Do you ask if it's ever proper to help another man? No—if he claims it as right or as a moral duty that you owe him. Yes—if such is your own desire based on your own selfish pleasure in the value of his person and his struggle” (AS975).

This strikes me as an odd use of “selfish” when the primary beneficiary of such action is somebody else.

She says, "...your own selfish pleasure..." and rejects any moral duty.  That describes something identical to a voluntary trade in that the help given provided more to the giver in that case than what was given.  If you see a struggling artist and like their work, and you make a donation and do so knowing that you don't have to and the amount you donate does not cause you any financial stress, then you have done so because your pleasure in furthering the art, and the artist that you admire is greater then the loss of a small sum of money.  It is selfish and like the side you are on in a trade, you are the primary beneficiary from your perspective.  In trade, each person is the primary beneficiary of their action.  That is important because it is a source of conflation in many arguments in this area.  

Who you hold as the primary value in the event where a choice is required, and who might be measured, in some transaction, as having benefited more, are not the same things.

A parent can be helping their children in the same fashion - they are not sacrificing because of the value of the children to them. The artist is different only in degree. And as Ayn Rand pointed out, it would be a sacrifice if a parent had to support other people's children at the expense of their own.
--------------------

Despite Ayn Rand’s many polemics against altruism as a moral ideal, it is not the case that she totally rejected altruism in the practical, concrete sense.

Here is where we disagree. If you define altruism as the philosophy where the primary value is others, then she did reject it totally and that is clear where she states, "...if he claims it as right or moral duty..." She is saying that when you must, as a moral principle engage in sacrifice, put the value of others above your own, then it is altruism and it is totally rejected.

And this takes us to the venn diagram on actions. To make an objective determination on whether an action has a primary beneficiary of 'other' or 'self' is not the same as to say that an action is morally required because it benefits other over self or visa versa. People hold mixed or muddled principles and they act with varying motivations and levels of awareness due to the nature of our psychology.

Actions are complex end states in the sense that we can abstract and isolate moral perspectives as a kind of way to view that aspect of an action. But we can also attempt to grasp the motivation behind a given action, and because of the complex state of the psychology of the actor at the time this can be difficult.  Because of our nature, and the requirments of the reality we live in, we must have a moral code, and we need to define a primary value, and all of our subsequent values will vary accordingly. And our psychology will vary to a degree based upon the entire structure of values we have at a time.
--------------------

Further, I'd say that even though an action can be examined, and an underlying moral principle might be identified, and in addition, it might be possible to identify the psychological aspects behind the action, there is an epistemological problem with going on to say that it is possible to objectively identify who the primary beneficiary is.  I say that because it presupposes that one is working from a given moral philosophy to start with.

There is a kind of fallacy to pointing at X and saying it is of "practical" value to this or that person. Putting the word "practical" in front of "value" doesn't take away the question of "by what standard?"  As an Objectivist, there may or may not be a primary beneficiary in a given interaction and the way an Objectivist judges the outcome of an interaction is in terms of each individual's benefits based upon the pursuit of their happiness and well-being.

Take a look at the various arguments by those who make use of "primary beneficiary" or "practical value" to see if there is ambiguation there.

Merlin,

I used "practical" in the essay once, and in retrospect "particular" would have been better. Note that I used "particular concrete actions" elsewhere. I did not use "practical" to mean pragmatic.

Understood. And I didn't mean to imply that you meant 'pragmatic.'
-------------

... "practical value" or
... the implied value of a "particular concrete action" or
... the implied value received by the "primary beneficiary"

All of these are all subject to the question: "Of value... by what standard?"

As Objectivists we should approach each particular concrete interaction having already settled the question, "What is the standard of value?"

There are advocates of altruism whose standard of value is benefit to society, or the welfare of others, or the measure of a sacrifice, etc.

And, as humans, we are subject to kinds of motivational forces: E.g., emotions, our understanding of relevant facts, our principles.

How can we put a particular concrete act into the category of altruistic or egoistic without two things:
1.) What is the psychology involved? (motivational orientation, principled beliefs, factual understandings)
2.) What is the standard of value?

When the approach is to put partiular concrete actions into categories by who is the "primary beneficiary" it still requires those two things.
--------------

If I stop and purchase a lemonade from a kid's lemon-aid stand, it is a particular concrete action. It is conceivable that I do so as an act of charity and don't even want the drink - and just want to help the kid out. It might be that I get a great deal of pleasure in seeing the smile on the kid and value that more than the drink or what I paid for it.  Or, I don't particularly like this kid, but I'm hot and thirsty.

I can't see how this act can be parsed on moral terms to fit the altruism versus egoism models without knowing my motivation. Someone else buying a lemonade might be a guilt-ridden Christian who hated children, but bought the lemonade, which they didn't want, out of a sense that they must make a sacrifice. That would be a totally different motivation.

There is also the question of how to make an external measurement of the benefits. The child gets some money and the customer gets a drink. It is a voluntary transaction. How do we rate one side of the transaction against the other? We can't even introduce the concept of "primary beneficiary" because we can't weigh the benefits of one accurately enough to see which value was greater.

I could go on and imagine that the child is being forced to do this by a parent who thinks it will be good for them, and my purchase of the lemonade takes the child closer to having to squeeze more lemons which he hates. Does that make me the primary beneficiary of an act that might have been intended as benevolent charity? With particular concrete acts, motivation can easily be the variable that has to somehow be eliminated inorder to use the action as an example of moral principle.

It is possible to make other changes in the lemonade example so that there would be a version that would fit each of 5 categories of the second of your venn diagrams.

There is a problem in switching back and forth between, A) attempting to look at the moral principles in comparing one moral philosophy to another, and B) attempting to place particular concrete acts in the same framework with broad moral principles. I'm not explaining this very well - sorry about that. But I think the problem has to do with a need to first establish the standard of value - what is it? Then, with that in hand, one can look at a particular concrete act and categorize it by the standard chosen (provided something is done to render motivation not a deciding factor).

Judging Human Action

We can only make judgments based upon what we know. And, our judgments will of course presuppose a standard by which the judgment is made. To call an act altruistic presumes some definition of what that is. When we witness and action, or are told of it, we will usually not know all of the surrounding facts and the questions we are presented with include, "What aspect of this action am I judging?" And, "Do I have enough of the facts to support such a judgment?"

A human action will have a motivation. In fact, it might have several motivations. A person might say they had a drink to be sociable but if they are a heavy drinker it might be that they were also self-medicating and would have had the drink if they were alone. That would be a case of a conscious motivation (or rationalization) combined a subconscious and emotional motivation. The action arises out of whatever understanding and mindset the individual works from.

I don't believe that we can always make a judgment on whether a particular action is altruistic or egoistic without knowing about the motivation. The reason for this is that we must at least partially internalize a given moral principle in some fashion before it can generate motivation (both the motivation that guides us consciously with thought, and the motivation that impels us with emotions).

We learn of these parents paying for the repair of their child's car. It is done as a gift rather than a loan, and the parents had to give up a planned dream vacation to free up the needed funds. Was that an altruistic act?  I maintain that no one can say yes or no without knowing more.  For example, the most likely explanation would arise out of a love for the child and valuing the child's ability to get to and from school more than they valued the weeks’ vacation. No sacrifice, no altruism. But it could have been different. Maybe they no longer get along with the child and don't even like him. But their church pastor tells them they must make a sacrifice and they have a duty to do this and that is why they pay for the repair. That's a different standard of value - and it is an altruistic act.

Altruism and Egoism are moral systems. Actions come from understanding and accepted principles and motivations. I think that there are cases where you have to know something of the principles the person acts on, and the motivations at work for an action before you can categorize the action as altruistic or egoistic.  

Merlin, I suspect that part of the communications gap we are having has to do with the definitions of altruism. For me, it requires the element of a moral duty that one place the well-being of another/others ahead of one's own. And that the concept of a 'primary beneficiary' isn't adequate to differentiate all actions and is often used ambiguously.

Merlin,

I agree that two exclusive circles are inadequate for classifying particular concrete actions.  But only because more information is needed about motivation, about the principle in play by the actors.  And we continue to disagree about the use of the phrase "who benefits from the action" as it is being used.

The son will benefit from the car being repaired far more than the parent, both materially and psychologically. The son is the primary beneficiary, unambiguously. And if the parent does it reluctantly, as an unwelcome cost but not a sacrifice, how much egoistic is that?

You are measuring "beneficial" as a factor of time or cost.  You mention "psychologically" but you haven't specified the parents' or the son's deepest motivations and beliefs in this area.  I’m not seeing much psychology.  You put the word "sacrifice" into that question, but that isn't known without knowing their motivation, without knowing the principle they acted upon.

I say that this is an altruistic act if it is done as a sacrifice made out of the belief that it is morally required.  If the parents went without a vacation out of a sense of duty, then it doesn't matter what the son got.  Instead of a car repair, maybe they stayed home to help the son find a job even though he really did NOT want them to do that.  Meaning the son gets nothing since he doesn't want, need or use the help, but the parents made their duty bound vacation sacrifice (I'm making up an example where they didn't want to do this, but thought they had to as a moral duty).  Who is the primary beneficiary in that example?  Do you see why it has to be the moral principle of sacrifice, which in turn is based upon the standard of another's life as the end, and not on the standard of one's own life as the end?

... egoism and altruism pertain to the question: Who benefits from the action? Oneself or somebody else?" Or both, as I also say. There is no presumption about altruism being an unchosen duty or self-sacrificial. It describes numerous actions such as parents feeding their children, giving gifts, and donating money.

And that is the problem.  You are talking about something that is unrelated to sacrifice or the objective purpose of one's life, or the standard of value (one's OWN life versus the life of others/society/etc.) whenever you go off into attempts to measure "primary beneficiary."  If the parent does this NOT out of a belief that they must make a sacrifice, then it is egoistic - no matter how unwelcome the cost.  If they do it, as in my previous post's example, because their local priest says they must, even if it hurts, even if they don't like their son, and even if they get nothing out of it, then it is altruistic.  But we can't decide based upon "primary beneficiary."

My understanding is that egoistic doesn't mean that one is constantly doing things that are exclusive to being happier, or wealthier, but that in any conflict between different options, different paths, one is choosing based upon values that are NOT sacrificial. 

To me, egoism is more of a natural state.  Most Objectivists are born-again egoists.  We started out in life following our own interests but along, the way, while we were learning necessary rules for living in society (like individual rights),  most of us were taught to make sacrifices in this or that area.  Now, being older and wiser, but mostly to the degree we've integrated the concept of rational self-interest, we behave as egoists.

As we become adults, we have to learn to be social, to understand where the boundaries are - in moral and legal rights - and even in etiquette, but if no one had come along and taught us that this or that kind of sacrifice was morally right, we would never have done anything outside of our own values.  And if someone came along and said, you have to sacrifice this or that, we have asked, "Why?"  Most religions and statist political philosophies and collectivist social ideologies are the ones that have come along through history and tried some kind of con game (or brute force) that is based upon the idea that we should go against our own natural interests.

I follow my interests and pursue my goals and look after my well-being, and if I feel pulled into some conflict between going after something and a feeling that I shouldn't, I look at it to see if it’s some fragment of altruism that I've been infected with at some point.

Suppose ... the parent put 20% of the miles on the car while the son put 80% of miles. Would you be willing to say that the parent's action was partly egoistic and mostly altruistic?

Would I be able to say that?  No, not based upon the usage.  I would need to know why they made the repair.  Did they feel altruistically motivated to repair the car as a sacrificial duty, and their 20% usage was just gravy?  Or, would they have repaired the car out of love for the son and felt no duty was involved - in which case the 20% is immaterial.  Or, they really want to keep using that 20% and they felt they needed to make a sacrifice so it was part egoistic and part altruistic.  But you don't know that till you know the motivations.  You can't make a MORAL categorization of an action without referring to the moral principle involved and "primary beneficiary" isn't going to work as the mechanism for separating altruism from egoism.

There are very good reasons why Rand defined altruism as she did.  And there are some not serious problems the attempts to dress up altruism as something other a moral duty to put the lives of others ahead of one's own.

Merlin,

Suppose instead the parent put 20% of the miles on the car while the son put on 80% of the miles. Would you be willing to say that the parent's action was partly egoistic and mostly X? If yes, what is X?

No, I wouldn't be willing to say that.  Because we don't know what the motivation was.

Your example is equating the relative allocations of car usage with motivation. And it might be just that simple in some cases. But, it could be a parent who feels morally obligated to sacrifice their money in providing a car for a son they don't even like, and who see the son's duty as to let the parent use it part of the time.

Or it might be a loving egoist of a parent who values helping their son for purely selfish reasons, and uses the car now and then. Those are radically different motivations. One belongs to altruism, and one belongs to egoism.  

And to make it more confusing, a person could primarily be an egoist and yet have some small areas of their life where they act to sacrifice out of a moral duty, and every altruist acts to some degree in their self-interest, if only to stay alive, but if we know the motivations that are primary in their lives, or the motivations that are behind a specific act then we can categorize them, or that act - but not before.

If we have no understanding of the motive, we have no way to parse out a moral understanding of a particular concrete action.

Working up rules or practices by which one measures who receives the most of something that is declared a benefit does NOT necessarily tell us why the parties engaged in the transaction. Was it a sense of moral duty that ran counter to objective self-interest, or a simple exercise of their objective self-interest?

Are you seeing words I've written that you can quote and then describe a fallacy in their logic?

Moments ago I was reading The Problem of "Selfishness" in the latest JARS (V14, no. 1). The author, Marsha Enright, says about Peter Keating in The Fountainhead, "Keating is not an altruist in the philosophical sense, giving up fame and fortune to help others. ... His is a psychological sacrifice, a sacrifice of character and achievements. He sacrifices his own personal desires and goals[.]"

Psychological sacrifice is not the kind of self-sacrifice I meant in my Venn diagram of egoistic action and altruistic action. The kind I meant, of course, was to help others, where the costs are money, material things, or time. Indeed, one cannot give one's character, personal desires or goals to somebody else.

Maybe Steve, as much as he is concerned about psychology and motivation, such psychological sacrifice is foremost in his mind. Just a thought that might contribute to our communications gap.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 7/22, 9:38am)

When I used to fight in full contact martial arts bouts I held a christian viewpoint of altruism when it came to dishing out pain.

It is much MUCH better to give than to receive.

(chuckles)

I was reading a book that quotes from Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols.

The natural value of egoism. — Self-interest is worth as much as the person who has it: it can be worth a great deal, and it can be unworthy and contemptible. Every individual may be scrutinized to see whether he represents the ascending or the descending line of life. Having made that decision, one has a canon for the worth of his self-interest. If he represents the ascending line, then his worth is indeed extraordinary — and for the sake of life as a whole, which takes a step farther through him, the care for his preservation and for the creation of the best conditions for him may even be extreme. The single one, the "individual," as hitherto understood by the people and the philosophers alike, is an error after all: he is nothing by himself, no atom, no "link in the chain," nothing merely inherited from former times; he is the whole single line of humanity up to himself. If he represents the descending development, decay, chronic degeneration, and sickness (sicknesses are, in general, the consequences of decay, not its causes), then he has small worth, and the minimum of decency requires that he take away as little as possible from those who have turned out well. He is merely their parasite.

Critique of the morality of decadence. — An "altruistic" morality — a morality in which self-interest wilts away — remains a bad sign under all circumstances. This is true of individuals; it is particularly true of nations. The best is lacking when self-interest begins to be lacking. Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself, to feel attracted by "disinterested" motives, that is virtually the formula of decadence. "Not to seek one's own advantage" — that is merely the moral fig leaf for quite a different, namely, a physiological, state of affairs: "I no longer know how to find my own advantage." Disintegration of the instincts! Man is finished when he becomes altruistic. (link)

This sounds Randian to me in a broad way. Nietzsche's "descending egoism" is akin to Rand's "Nietzschean egoism" in The Virtue of Selfishness and Rand's "traditional egoism" in Letters of Ayn Rand.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 7/27, 4:03am)

Ayn Rand wrote that a man should live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself.

By an “altruistic action” in my Venn diagram I mean doing something at least partly for the benefit (sake) of somebody else.

Suppose the following. A person P goes to a restaurant with several other people and will the pay the bill for all. The bill comes and P notices that there is no charge for one of the entrees. He could easily pay the bill as is, rationalizing that somebody else made the mistake. Or P1 could point out the error and end up paying more. If P chooses the latter, then P “acts at least partly for the sake of somebody else.” This is not to say that P has no interest in being honest, but the action is not a benefit materially to P at the time. It is a cost materially. Nor is the benefit to somebody else merely incidental.

Doing something for the benefit (sake) of somebody else on a particular occasion is not tantamount to living for the sake of somebody else.